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Abstract The term ‘biosimilar’ refers to an alternative
similar version of an off-patent innovative originator
biotechnology product (the ‘reference product’). Several
biosimilars have been approved in Europe, and a number of
top-selling biological medicines have lost, or will lose,
patent protection over the next 5 years. We look at the
experience in Europe so far. The USA has finally imple-
mented a regulatory route for biosimilar approval. We
recommend that European and US governments and payers
take a strategic approach to get value for money from the
use of biosimilars by (1) supporting and incentivising
generation of high-quality comprehensive outcomes data
on the effectiveness and safety of biosimilars and origi-
nator products; and (2) ensuring that incentives are in place
for budget holders to benefit from price competition. This
may create greater willingness on the part of budget
holders and clinicians to use biosimilar and originator
products with comparable outcomes interchangeably, and
may drive down prices. Other options, such as direct price
cuts for originator products or substitution rules without
outcomes data, are likely to discourage biosimilar entry.
With such approaches, governments may achieve a one-off
cut in originator prices but may put at risk the creation of a
more competitive market that would, in time, produce
much greater savings. It was the creation of competitive
markets for chemical generic drugs—notably, in the USA,
the UK and Germany—rather than price control, that
enabled payers to achieve the high discounts now taken for
granted.
Key Points for Decision Makers
Payers and decision makers need to think
medium/long term if they want to achieve
significant, sustained savings from use of
biosimilars.
High-quality comprehensive outcomes data on the
effectiveness and safety of biosimilars and originator
products are required to ensure that they can be used
interchangeably.
Incentives are also needed for budget holders to
benefit from using biosimilars.
Over time, in some therapy areas, outcomes data
may lead to discounts approaching chemical generic
levels and support the introduction of substitution
rules.
Initiatives focusing on short-term savings—such as
price cuts for originators, reference pricing or
substitutability rules (without the outcomes data
mentioned above)—are likely to put at risk the
creation of a more competitive market that would, in
time, produce much greater savings.
1 Introduction
Biotherapeutic or biological medicines have active ingre-
dients derived from proteins (such as growth hormone,
insulin and antibodies) and other substances produced by
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living organisms (such as cells, viruses and bacteria). They
are larger and more complex than chemically synthesised
medicines, are therefore harder to manufacture and are
usually administered as an infusion. There has been a rapid
worldwide increase in the number of biological medicines
receiving regulatory approval.
The term ‘biosimilar’ refers to an off-patent version of
an innovative ‘reference’ biologic. The European Medici-
nes Agency (EMA) states that ‘‘a similar biological or
biosimilar medicine is a biological medicine that is similar
to another biological medicine that has already been
authorised for use’’ [1] and that ‘‘Biosimilars are not the
same as generics, which have simpler chemical structures
and are considered to be identical to their reference
medicines’’ [2]. In line with the EMA, the US Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) states that ‘‘A biosimilar
product is a biological product that is approved based on a
showing that it is highly similar to an FDA-approved
biological product, the reference product, and has no
clinically meaningful differences in terms of safety and
effectiveness from the reference product’’ [3]. A number of
biosimilars have been approved already by the EMA:
erythropoietins (EPOs), granulocyte colony-stimulating
factors (GCSFs), growth hormones and, more recently,
monoclonal antibodies (mAbs). The GCSF Zarxio (fil-
grastim-sndz) was the first biosimilar product approved by
the FDA, in March 2015, and was available for launch
from September 2015.
We set out proposals building on previous analysis [4] to
ensure that European and US third-party payers can secure
value from biosimilars, as many top-selling biological
medicines have lost, or will lose, patent protection over the
next 5 years. Before doing so, we outline (1) the EU reg-
ulatory process; (2) economic characteristics of biosimilars
and evidence from Europe; (3) differences from chemical
generics; and (4) developments in the US market, where
biosimilar regulatory pathways have lagged behind those in
Europe.
2 Regulatory Processes in Europe
EMA biosimilar pathway guidelines were first published in
2005, followed by a number of product-specific guidelines.
An extensive comparability exercise, including clinical
work, is required to demonstrate quality, safety and effi-
cacy similar to those of the reference product.
Assessment of substitution and interchangeability with
the originator product is not part of the EMA’s scientific
evaluation [2] but is a Member State competency. The
EMA states that patients should address questions related
to switching from one biological medicine to another to
their doctor and pharmacist. Substitution of biologics
(including between an innovator and a biosimilar) by a
pharmacist without the permission of the prescribing doc-
tor either is not allowed or is advised against in the vast
majority of EU countries (including Italy, Spain, the UK,
the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany). This includes
countries that do allow chemical generic substitution.
3 Competition in Europe’s Biosimilars Market
Initial research on biosimilar entry [5–7] suggested that
competition between a reference product and biosimi-
lar(s) would resemble brand-to-brand competition (focus-
ing on price, quality and promotion) rather than generic-to-
brand competition. Experience to date confirms this
hypothesis. Competition is, however, still evolving.
Evidence suggests that it is difficult to generalise across
either therapy areas or countries in Europe, for four rea-
sons. First, clinician willingness and receptiveness to use
biosimilars across therapy areas differ, resulting in higher
biosimilar penetration for GCSFs and EPOs than for
growth hormones [4, 8]. Second, the scope for biosimilar
competition is lessened for markets with high price com-
petition pre-biosimilar entry. Third, biosimilar penetration
differs across countries according to the incentives imple-
mented to encourage usage. Germany, Sweden and the
UK—all successful chemical generic markets—have rela-
tively high biosimilar penetration. Fourth, some biosimilars
are administered by physicians in clinics and hospitals,
while others are self-administered or are administered by
home health providers and dispensed through specialty
retail pharmacies. Incentives to promote biosimilar use
differ among channels. Regulations and incentives to pro-
mote biosimilar uptake primarily impact at the hospital and
physician levels. Retail pharmacists have little incentive to
promote biosimilar uptake [9].
Analyses shows disparities of biosimilar penetration
across Europe [10–12]. Germany, with strong incentives to
encourage biosimilar uptake, has the highest penetration
rates in the EPO market, where volume sales of the orig-
inator product were matched by those of biosimilars in
2009 [13] in spite of the originator cutting its price. By the
end of 2011, biosimilars accounted for more than 60 % in
volume terms [8]. EPOs are mainly dispensed in retail
pharmacists in Germany, and substitution rules (as well as
prescription incentives; see below) have favoured EPO
biosimilar uptake [12]. For GCSFs, however, the origina-
tor’s price has remained stable, and the biosimilars’ market
share accounted for less than 50 % by the end of 2011.
Omnitrope, a biosimilar growth hormone, has had much
lower uptake in spite of a price discount of around 30 %
[13]. It seems that clinicians have had concerns about
efficacy and safety in the paediatric population it serves
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[14]. It has been argued that the German base of many
biosimilar companies has also helped the uptake in Ger-
many [8, 12]. Penetration of biosimilars in Germany has
occurred in spite of reference pricing (RP), which we
would expect to discourage biosimilar entry and use by
pulling down the price of the originator. There are, how-
ever, four important offsetting factors. First, the RP cal-
culation generates higher prices to incentivise further
market entry when there are fewer generic competitors [15,
16]. Second, drugs are generally exempt from co-payment
if they are priced at 30 % or more below the RP, increasing
the attractiveness to clinicians of prescribing them [17].
Third, payers and manufacturers can negotiate confidential
rebates, which are not reflected in the list price used for
referencing. As part of these agreements, payers often also
exempt patients from co-payment. Fourth, a quota system,
by which physicians have to prescribe a certain percentage
of biosimilars, has encouraged prescribing [11, 12, 16].
In Sweden, the biosimilar penetration rates for both
EPOs and GCSFs have exceeded 60 %. In the UK, the rates
are 10 and 80 %, respectively. The low UK biosimilar EPO
uptake reflects high discounting by competing brands prior
to biosimilar entry [19]. The penetration rates for GCSF
biosimilars (filgrastim—reference product Neupogen; a
number of biosimilars exist, including Zarzio, Tevagrastim,
Ratiograstim and Nivestim) in Italy and France have
approached 45 and 60 %, respectively, with EPO biosim-
ilar use being around 15 % in both countries [19]. Greater
acceptance of GCSF biosimilars in these two countries may
be the consequence of medical considerations and/or
reimbursement policies [8, 20]. The Italian Agency for
Medicines (AIFA) has approved eight of 12 EMA-ap-
proved biosimilars; Italian Regional Health Authorities
have facilitated biosimilar entry and price competition with
tenders [21]. However, Spain also uses tenders but has
minimal biosimilar use [22].
Austria’s application of its generic pricing policy to
biosimilars represents an unusual, somewhat simplistic,
biosimilar pricing policy in Europe. The first biosimilar
that is launched must be priced at 52 % of the reference
drug, the second at 44 % and the third at 40 %. The ref-
erence drug and the other two biosimilars must be priced at
40 % of the originator’s original price when the third
biosimilar enters. This policy has discouraged biosimilar
competition, and no third biosimilar has been launched in
Austria [18].
Entry by second-generation improvements on ‘reference
products’ before biosimilar entry, for both GCSFs and
EPOs, cannibalised sales of the first-generation products
across European countries [8]. These second-generation
products require substantially fewer infusions over a course
of treatment, with potential benefits to patients and lower
administration costs [8]. As with chemical generics,
successful second-generation products reduce the potential
for cost savings by reducing the market share of the first-
generation reference product subject to biosimilar
competition.
Two infliximab biosimilars (Remsima and Inflectra;
reference product Remicade) were approved by the EMA
in 2013 [4]. Norway offers an interesting case study, for
two reasons: (1) use of tenders; and (2) promotion of out-
comes studies exploring the impact of switching. Biosim-
ilar penetration in Norway for GCSFs and EPOs is among
the highest in Europe. In January 2014, Orion Pharma
(which distributes Celltrion’s Remsima in Scandinavia and
Estonia) secured the first position for its biosimilar product
Remsima in the tender for national supply of infliximab by
offering a 39 % discount against Remicade [23, 24].
However, in March 2015, Orion proposed a 72 % price
reduction for Remsima [23]. This level of discount has
stunned industry observers, as much lower discounts were
expected [23]. To promote a substitution culture, the
Norwegian Medicines Agency is funding a clinical study
(the NOR-SWITCH study) [25] to explore Remicade and
Remsima/Inflectra’s interchangeability. The trial is still
recruiting patients, and the results are expected in April
2016. In July 2015, the Dutch authorities began funding a
similar trial (BIO-SWITCH [26, 27]) to study the effects on
efficacy, safety and immunogenicity of switching treatment
from Remicade to an infliximab biosimilar in patients with
rheumatoid arthritis, spondyloarthritis or psoriatic arthritis.
The results are expected in April 2017.
4 Economics of Biosimilars: Differences
from Chemical Generics
Economic theory suggests five reasons not to expect sim-
ilar levels of price discounting for biosimilars in compar-
ison with chemical generics. First, biosimilar development
costs are considerably higher, as biosimilars require pre-
clinical and clinical studies. Second, biologic manufactur-
ing costs are higher. Third, manufacturers need to com-
municate with prescribers as well as pharmacists, as
prescribing is done by brand name. Originators have
established relationships with prescribers, key opinion
leaders and patients, based on services, clinical develop-
ment and data. Biosimilar-only manufacturers cannot
replicate these without substantial investment [28]. Fourth,
physician (and pharmacist) concerns about comparability
may need to be addressed in post-launch studies [6, 29, 30],
raising costs and reducing adoption rates relative to those
of chemical generics. We can expect lower sales initially
because of concerns on the part of some physicians
regarding the degree of substitutability between the refer-
ence product and its biosimilar(s). Fifth, because of all of
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the above, we can expect fewer biosimilar entrants and
consequently less intense biosimilar price competition [31–
33].
These factors (development costs; manufacturing costs;
potential prescriber concerns, raising entry hurdles; the
need for post-launch data; and the degree of competition)
help to explain why price differentials including discounts
(to date) between biosimilars and their reference products
in Europe can typically be less than 30 % [8, 10, 11] as
compared with 80 % plus discounts for chemical generic
drugs—again, with the caveat that there are differences
across therapy areas and countries, and noting the recent
exception of infliximab’s biosimilar discount in Norway.
Prices need to be high enough for long enough to reward
biosimilar manufacturers if a competitive market is to exist
over time. Given these factors, the long-term equilibrium
price for a sustainable biosimilars market should be some-
where between the long-run equilibrium for a chemical
generic market—albeit with higher manufacturing costs
impacting the level of pricing—and a monopolistic compe-
tition-type situation (with a large number of sellers, and with
entry and exit costs being zero) in which manufacturers have
to maintain a higher cost base in order to invest in their
product, which is how biosimilars were first modelled [5,
34]. In practice, discounts against reference products could
increase to generic levels over time if outcomes studies
support interchangeability and/or substitution [6].
Evidence from chemical generics shows that price reg-
ulation for entry generally appears to be associated with
reduced incentives and limited diffusion after entry [35,
36]. On the other hand, effective demand-side incentives—
including physician budgets linked to incentives, generic
substitution (possibly linked to incentives) and generic
prescribing incentives—encourage generic usage [37, 38].
We can expect similar effects on biosimilar use from price
regulation (negative) and demand incentives (positive).
5 The US Market: Projected Cost Savings
and Recent Developments
The US lags behind Europe in developing a clearly defined
regulatory pathway for biosimilars. In March 2010, the US
Congress established an abbreviated approval pathway for
biosimilars (under the 2009 Biologics Price Competition
and Innovation Act [BPCIA]). Recently, the FDA has
implemented a regulatory route for biosimilar approval,
albeit that uncertainties remain as to the extent of the
evidence required by the FDA. This will affect entry costs
and thus the nature of biosimilar competition.
The FDA is devising a process to establish similarity
along EMA lines. The legislation, however, also requires it
to provide guidance on ‘‘a higher standard of similarity to a
reference product—interchangeability—reflecting an FDA
assessment that pharmacists can make substitutions
between biologics without the prescribers’ intervention’’
[31]. Achieving a favourable FDA interchangeability
opinion (note that in the USA, this refers to substitutability
at the pharmacy level) might require manufacturers to
undertake additional switching clinical trials and other
studies [20, 39]. The benefits would be pharmacist substi-
tution and reduced need for post-launch outcomes research.
In July 2015, the US Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit concluded the Amgen versus Sandoz Zarxio case.
At issue were two BPCIA provisions: (1) that the applicant
‘‘shall’’ provide to the reference product sponsor a copy of
its application and also manufacturing information; (2) that
the biosimilar applicant will provide 180 days’ notice to
the reference product sponsor that it intends to enter the
marketplace. The Court held the contemplated information
exchange as being non-mandatory. However, if an appli-
cant filing an abbreviated Biologics License Application
(BLA) fails to participate in that information exchange, it
must wait for FDA approval of its biosimilar product prior
to providing 180 days’ advance notice to the reference
product sponsor that it intends to begin commercial mar-
keting [40]. Sandoz (Zarxio’s applicant) did not provide the
information to Amgen (the manufacturer of the reference
product, Neupogen). Given that Zarxio obtained FDA
approval on 5 March 2015, it could be marketed from
2 September 2015.
Estimates of savings from biosimilars over a 10-year
framework in the USA have ranged between $25 billion
and $100 billion [41–43]. A review of estimates for both
the EU and the USA has been set out by Rovira et al. [13].
The differences in savings arise from different assumptions
for two key parameters: penetration rates and price dis-
counts. More aggressive assumptions on biosimilar uptake
and price discounts yield higher potential cost savings.
Two additional assumptions affect forecast savings: (1)
baseline spending on biologics; and (2) the timing of US
regulatory pathway implementation.
Grabowski et al. [8] highlighted how uncertainties
around the regulatory pathway might reduce projected cost
savings in the short/medium term. Only favourable expe-
riences with biosimilars over the next few years, and reg-
ulatory clarity, will enable biosimilars to produce
substantial cost savings.
They also noted [8] that delays in establishing a
biosimilar regulatory route have led some companies to
consider filing using the BLA route, i.e. as a new biologic
drug. This route is also available for ‘biobetters’—taken to
mean biologics from the same molecule but with modifi-
cations giving superiority (e.g. in the delivery mechanism).
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6 Recommendations
Our recommendations distinguish between pricing and
reimbursement systems that use health technology assess-
ment (HTA)—and, in particular, cost-effectiveness analy-
sis—and those that do not. There are also differences
between the EU and US markets [19].
For those systems not relying systematically on HTA,
there are five levers for intervention by government in
biosimilars markets:
1. Substitutability rules, permitting pharmacists to sub-
stitute one biosimilar for another.
2. Direct price intervention, pushing down originator
product prices in the form of:
(a) Originator inclusion in RP systems with
biosimilars.
(b) A post-patent expiry price cut imposed on the
innovator and/or a cut imposed on a biosimilar
entrant.
3. Tendering procedures to facilitate biosimilar competi-
tion and price reductions.
4. Incentives for budget holders to use lower-cost prod-
ucts when these are safe and effective, and so provide
better value for money.
5. Market support (e.g. investing in infrastructure for
outcomes monitoring and facilitating pharmacovigi-
lance work, collecting real-world evidence), creating
greater willingness on the part of budget holders and
clinicians to seek value for money by using biosimilars
and originator products interchangeably.
With regard to lever 1, governments are understandably
reluctant to implement automatic substitution. An exception
is France, which has introduced legislation (on 1 January
2014) allowing substitution of biosimilars but only for a
patient beginning a course of treatment; substitution cannot
be made part-way through a course. It cannot be done if the
prescriber has written ‘‘non-substitutable’’ on the form. Any
replacement product would have to be included in ‘similar
biologic’ groups, which are still to be drawn up [12]. We
recommend that substitution in a therapy area be imple-
mented at a much later stage when strong biosimilar real-
world evidence is available in that therapy area.
Lever 2 (direct price intervention) is counterproductive.
RP, for example, assumes a degree of interchangeability
not initially likely to be reflected in clinicians’ willingness
to switch products. More fundamentally, it may preclude
collection of real-world evidence and discourage biosimilar
entry by reducing potential biosimilar revenues, such that
biosimilar manufacturers might not expect to recover one
or both of their development costs and costs of collecting
post-launch outcomes data. In our view, it is not possible to
‘jump start’ a biosimilars market by forcing down prices or
by imposing substitutability. Governments may achieve a
one-off cut, but they put at risk the creation of more
competitive markets that would, in time, produce much
greater savings. We note the use of RP in Germany, but we
conclude above that the particular features of the calcula-
tion mechanism, interaction with co-payments, confidential
discounts and incentives for physicians negate its adverse
effects on biosimilar entry. The experience with generics
elsewhere highlights how strict price regulation can hinder
competition [35, 36].
Lever 3 (biosimilar tendering) is being used in Norway,
Italy and Spain. However, the evidence from their use is
mixed. The Italian experience suggests that tenders can drive
down prices and generate savings, depending on the number
of manufacturers participating in the tender [21]. ‘Winner
takes all’ tenders also pose another barrier to entry; the risk
of not winning the tender and thus not gaining any market
share can discourage entry. Another potential problem with
tenders is the risk of shortages. If there is a supply shortage
from the tender winner, substitution is expensive.
Given the relatively efficient way in which biosimilars
markets are likely to evolve, we would recommend use of
levers 4 and 5. Financial incentives to use biosimilars are
important and account for the progress of biosimilars in
those European markets with successful chemical generic
markets. Germany has the most favourable incentives and
the most successful biosimilar penetration rates. Grabowski
et al. [8] noted that incentives for US biosimilar use were
addressed in the Affordable Care Act by giving clinicians
the same Medicare reimbursement amount as the origina-
tor. Yet clinician concerns about the exact nature of
‘similar’ outcomes have to be addressed.
We regard lever 5 as key for governments taking a more
strategic approach. We recommend supporting and incen-
tivising generation and use of high-quality comprehensive
outcomes data on the effectiveness and safety of biosimi-
lars and originator products. In European markets, clini-
cians’ receptiveness and willingness to use biosimilars
determine biosimilar adoption rates. Outcomes studies can
reinforce prescribers’ confidence in biosimilars. They
could also explore the value for money of second-genera-
tion biotech products that are competing with the first-
generation originator and biosimilar products. Govern-
ment/payer/industry collaboration to determine how to
generate these outcomes data and value-for-money data
would be helpful. The results should be made public once
they are available. Supporting market evolution and sus-
tainability in this way will secure a path towards max-
imising price competition over time, enabling payers and
patients to gain substantial savings from biologic patent
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expiry. The NOR-SWITCH and BIO-SWITCH studies are
important examples of the use of this approach.
We recommend that HTA-driven systems not treat
biosimilars as generics, which are usually automatically
excluded from new drug appraisals. Two factors should
determine whether biosimilars are subject to HTA:
1. Has the reference product been appraised?
2. Is the reference product the standard of care?
If the reference product has been appraised and is the
standard of care, an HTA process is not needed for
biosimilars at launch. If there is an appraisal, a cost-
minimisation analysis would suffice, as there is no more
evidence on outcomes than those available to the
regulator.
If the reference product was not appraised or was
appraised but is not the standard of care, because it was
originally rejected or restricted, then the rationale for
appraising the biosimilar is stronger. Under this scenario,
cost–utility analysis is more appropriate, and the com-
parator should be the standard of care and not the reference
product.
7 Conclusions
Evidence on the nature of competition between biosimilars
and their reference products in Europe confirms the earlier
hypothesis that such competition would not resemble the
aggressive price competition associated with chemical
generics. There are, however, important differences across
therapy areas and countries.
We believe that levers 4 and 5 are the right direction of
travel for governments and payers to maximise long-term
savings from biosimilars. Prescribers need confidence in
outcomes, and they and/or the health system need to benefit
financially from using biosimilars. The Norwegian and
Dutch initiatives to collect real-world evidence is a move
in the right direction. The results from such studies will
impact use positively if the results are favourable. Such
studies will become even more important if payers are to
reap the benefits from the next wave of biosimilars—no-
tably, mAbs—where concerns over outcomes and safety
may be greater.
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